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1. SUMMARY: In this first federal habeas pet] tion, -
petr contends: (1) that admission of psvchiatric testimony to 
prove future dangerousness violated his Fifth Amendment Privilege 
against self incrimination; (2} that the rA4 misapplied Zant v. 
Steohens in holding that, even assuming that the testimony was 
unconstitu 
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cause the iurv found another untajnted aggravati~~ circumstance~ 
(3) that he was deprived of etfective assistance of counsel~ and 
(4) that the jury instructions were inconsistent with Lockett 
because they failed to make clear that the iury retained the pre-
rogative of recommending life even if it found one or more aggra-
vating circumstances. 
2. FAC'T'S AND nECIS IONS BELOW: Pe tr was found qui J. tv 
and sentenced to death for the 1977 rape/murder of Au~rev 
Weiller. One day after he gave a full confession and was arrest-
ed, the court appointed David Pugh to represent him. Pugh imrne-
diately requested that petr be examined to netermine whether he 
was competent to stand trial. After the examiner concluded that 
he was, Pugh began to explore the possibility of presenting psy-
chiatric evidence as a mitigating circumstance. Towards that 
end, he requested and received permission to hire two osvchia-
~----------------------trists to interview petr. Prior to both interviews Puqh in-
structed petr not to nivulqe anv information concerning the mur-
der or any prior offense. Appx at 68. That advice went unheeded. 
During the second examination, oetr stated that several vears 
earJier, while employed as a school bus driver, he had torn off a 
girl's clothes before deciding not to rape her. Prior to this 
revelation, the psychiatrist, Dr. Pile, encouraged petr to make a 
full disclosure of any orior criminal behavior. Or. Pile did not 
warn petr that his statements might later be adduced at trial. 
Nor did he inform him that copies of his report might be sent to 
the Commonwealth and to the court. 
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At the sentencing hearinq, the prosecution ~ut on four wit-
nesses, including Dr. Pile. Over petr's objection, he described 
--....., 
petr's account of the school bus inci~ent. On cross examination, 
Pugh asked him about his diagnosis of petr. Pjle responded 'l:'l y 
suggesting that he was a sociopathic personality and that he had 
a proclivity towards sexual deviancy and rape. Petr then called 
12 character witnesses and petr's oarents. They testified that 
he was a regular churchgoer, a member of the choir, a good bus 
driver, a conscientious student i.n high school and had been a 
good soldier in Vietnam. His parents also testified about his 
model life on the tamily owned GospeJ Spreadinq r.hurch Farm. The 
jury returned and the trial judge accepted a recommendation o f 
death. The iury ind1cated that it had found two statutory aggra-
vating circumstances: 
~
future dangerousness and the 
~
vile" nature of the offense. 
"wantonlv -
The ~irginif3. Supreme r.ourt affirmet1 the conviction and sen-
tence. Petr did not assign as error the admission of Dr. Piles 
testimony. Although Amicus Post-Conviction Assistance Proiect of -
the University of Virginia Law School did raise the issue, the 
court's lengthy opinion did not address it. This court denied 
cert, 441 u.s. 967 (1979). 
Petr then petitioned for state t;>ost conviction relief. J:.Tis 
principal contention was that he had been denied effective as-
sistance of counsel. In the context of re4ectinq that conten-
tion, the court fully discussed the claim that Piles's testimonv 
was inadmissible. Although the opinion is not entirelv cleaT:', 
the purpose of the discussion seems to have been to answer the 
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argument that failure to appeal on this point ref ected constitu-
tionally deficient representation. See App. '57-72. In conclud-
ing that Pugh's failure to appeal was understandable in liqht of 
the circumstances of the case and the state of the 1 aw at the 
time of trial, the court confronted and reiected the claim tl-Jat 
~
admission of the testimony violated petr's Fifth or Sixth Amen~-
ment rights. Petr again petitioned for cert, and the petn was -again denied, 454 u.s. ] 128 (1981). The memo writer focused ex-
elusively on the ineffective assistance claim. 
Petr then instituted the present petition t:or haheas relief 
in the federal district court (EDVa, MacKenzie). Without holding 
an evidentiarv hearing, the court dismissed the Petition. The 
v CA4 affirmed. It acknowledged that petr 's objection to the ad-
miss ion of Pile's testimony might be bar red by rRai nwd qht v. 
Sykes. Nonetheless, it concluded that "the imminent execution of 
Smith serves as sufficient grounds to review the issue on the 
merits." App. 6. Turning to the "merits," the court conclu~eo 
that petr 's claim was foreclosed by Zant v. Stepl-Jens, 462 u.S. 
-~
862, 884 (1983). Because the iurv had found two aggravating cir-
cumstances, one of which was inrHsputahlv valid, it didn't make 
any difference whether the admission of Piles's testimony was 
improper. The court also reiected the claim that petr was de-
prived of effective assistance of counsel. Counsel's failure to 
explore more fully the possibility that petr suffered from a po-
tentially debilitating mental incapacity was entirely reasonable 
given that the psyciatrists who testified would have denied such 
a condition. Finally, the court rejected petr's challenge to the 
- 5 -
jury charge at the sentencing hearing. 
dieted that the iury was not to impose the sentence of neath i.f 
it concluded that mitigating circumstances justified life imprts-
onment instead. 
'3. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that the CA4 's rel i. a nee 
on Zant v. Stephens was clearly incorrect. That case does stand 
for the proposition that in some circumstances a neath sentence 
supported by two aggravating circumstances remains valid even if 
one of them is subsequently found improper. But the decision was 
expressly ljmited to instances in which the the evidence adduced 
in support of the invalid circumstance was itself admissible. If 
admission of Piles's testimony was i.n fact barred by the Sixth 
Amendment, Stephens is simp1y not a proper basis for affirming 
the conviction. 
Turning to the substantive Si.xth Amendment question, netr 
contends that the TC erred in admitting Pile's testimony. !n 
Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581 F.2d 75, 80 (CA4 1978) the Court held 
that "[a]n incriminating statement made during a psychiatric ex-
ami nation cannot be used to prove a defendant's guilt, whether 
the defendant or the prosecutor requested the examination." The 
CA4 's rationale was that a defenf!ant cannot adequately explore 
possible psychological f!efenses unless the psychiatric examiners 
are free to make a full inquiry concerning the circumstances of 
the offense or any prior related offenses. Thus, petr contends, 
he was put to an unconstitutional chojce: to either talk freely 
to the psychiatrist but risk having his words could come back to 
haunt him, or to remain silent and there by foreclose meaningf:ul 
- 6 -
inquiry into psychiatric defenses. Whether the rtqht js found in 
I 
the Fifth or Sixth Amendments, the ooint is that the nefendant 
needs access to a psychiatric evaluation to defend himself, ann 
his right to defend himself is severely compromised, if not com-
pletely undermined, i.f he must surrender his privilege aqainst 
self incrimination as the price for expJoring passible defenses 
in exculpation or mitigation. This Court should grant cert to 
establish that the state may not condition access to rnentaJ 
health assistance on a waiver of f i tth amendment rights. In so 
ruling, the Court would be adopting a position consistent with 
virtually every state and federal court that has confronted the 
issue. See, e. !l_., United States v. AJverez, '519 F.2d 1036, 
1 0 45-4 7 ( CA3 19 7 5) • 
Petr next contends that Pugh's representation was constitu-
tionally deficient in the following respects: 1) by advising oetr 
to remain silent during his psvchiatric interviews, thus preclud-
ing meaningful exploration of defenses~ /.) by failure to prepare 
adequately for cross-examination of the psychiatric witnesses and 
thereby accidently eliciting extremely damaging testimony from 
Dr. Piles~ and 3) by failing to acquire the minjmally sufficient 
knowledge necessary to impeach Piles's diagnosis~ 4) by failing 
to adequately investigate the only meaningful defense, the pres-
ence of mitigating mental abnormalities within the meaning of Va. 
Code Ann. ~ 19.2-264.4(B). Perhaps counsel's chief fault was in 
failing to inform the interviewing osvchiatrists about the nature 
of the various nefenses available under Va. law so that thev 
could focus their examination. Moreover, the record makes clear 
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that counsel's incompetence was hiqhly prejudidial within the 
. 'I 
meaninq of Strickland v. Washington. ~he tri~l record shows 
clearly that the jury relied on Piles' testimony and was encour-
aged to do so by the prosecutor. In fact, on two occasions, ju-
rors interrupted the psychiatric testimony to ask f.:or furt11er 
explanations of the diagnoses. P rej ud ice is, the ref ore, man i-
fest. 
Finally, petr contends that the iury instructions at the 
sentencing phase were constitutionally defective. The TJ charged 
as follows: 
~he Court instructs the jury that the penalty 
of death shall not be imposed unless you find 
that the ~ommonwea1th has proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt that: 
1. fthe dangerousness circumstance]~ 
2. rThe vileness circumstance] 
You may fix his punishment at death. 
If you find that the C::ornmonweal th has 
failed to prove either (1) or (2) above be-
yond a reasonable doubt, or if you find that 
other mitjgating circumstances do not iustify 
a sentence of death, you may fix the defend-
ant's punishment at life imprisonment. 
The constitutional defect lies in the second paragraPh, 
which explicitly states that the iury is permitted to impose a 
life sentence if the Commonwealth fails to prove an aqgravating 
circumstance or if the iury finds a superseding mitigating cir-
cumstance. The instruction provides no express guidance to the 
jury as to what it should do if it finds an aggr a vat i nq circum-
stance and no superseding mitigating circumstance. However, it 
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clearly implies that the jury is required to imp~e a ~eath sen-
' tence in such a case. 'rhus, it puts a "thumb on the death sine 
of the scale." Petn at 49. At the very least, it 5s confusing 
and thus deprived petr of the kind of guidance necessarv to avoid 
arbitrary imposition of the death sentence. 'l'he Eighth Amendment 
requires, at the very least, that the ~ury be instructed that it 
retains the option of recommending life in all cases, even when 
if finds aggravating circumstances. See Spivey v. Zant, 661 F.2d 
464 (CAS 1981); Tucker v. Zant, 724 F.2d 882, 891 (CAI1 1.). 
/ 
Resp maintains that Wainwright v. Svkes, bars consideration 
of petr 's claim that Piles' testimony was improperly admitted. 
Under the rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, only errors 
assigned in the petition for appeal will be noticed. Petr's fail-
ure to appeal this claim now forecloses review. Moreover, Pugh's 
testimony at the state habeas hearing j nd icates that he con-
sciously eJected not to pursue that claim because, at the time, 
he didn't think it was meritorious. Because Pugh's representation 
was 
does 
because constitutionally adequatL nd 
not constitute "cause," Engle v. Issac, 
perceived futility 
456 u.s. 107, 130 
n.36 (1982), there is no possible basis for reviewing this claim. 
Even were the issue open, resp continues, Dr. Piles's testi-
mony was admissible. See Smith v. Wainwright, 741 F.2d 1248 (CA1J 
1984) • As the state court expl ici tl y found, Pugh expl ici tl y and 
repeatedly advised petr not to discuss past offenses with the 
psychiatrist. Whatever rights petr may have had were clearly 
waived by his decision to talk candidly with Piles. In any 
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I 
' event, the CA4 correctly concluded that 0ant v. ,§tephens renders 
' anv error harmless. Even were Zant inapplicable, admission o~ 
testimony concerning the school bus must be consielerecl harmless 
in light of the overwhelming evidence of future nangerousness 
that was properly admit ted, including a prior conviction for 
rape. Resp also denies that Pugh's representation was def ici.ent 
and that the jury instruction was in any way erroneous. 
4. DISCUSSION: 
1. Non-certworthy issues. Neither the ineffective assist-
ance claim or the challenge to the iury instructions is substan-
ti al. No doubt, Pugh could have been better prepared. But I 
doubt very much that h j s representation f. ell outs ine the broad 
range of competence tolerated by the Sixth Amendment. l-Ie put on 
some fourteen witnesses at the sentencing hearing in an effort to 
adduce evidence in mitigation. Although he bunglen the presenta-
tion of the psychiatric evidence somewhat, he nid meaninqfullv 
investigate that avenue of nefense. In~een, in his closing argu-
ment he made a heartfelt pi. tch for leniency on the bas is of 
petr's mental condition. See S.A. 17-19. On balance, I believe 
that the level of representation was sufficiently hjgh to satisfy 
the Sixth Amendment. 
As to the challenge to the charge, even if the Constitution 
does require the sentencing judge to inform the iury that it at 
all times retains the option of recommending life, 'T'ucker, 724 
F.2d, at 891, the jury instructions here would pass muster. Al-
though not a model of clarity, as I read the charge it ~ully con-
veyed the message that the jury was free to recoJTUTiend life even 
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if if found one or more aggravating ci~cumstance~. After recit-. ~r 
ing the "dangerousness" and "vileness" circumitances, the TJ 
stated, "you may fix his punishment at death." Moreover, the 
balance of the charge suggested quite clearly that if the iury 
found "other mitigating circumstances" it could fix the punish-
ment at life whether or not it the state had proven an aggravat-
2. Petr's obiection to the ad-
mission troubling~n- ~ 
deed, as dis cussed below, the constitutionality of the govern-
ment's use of statements made by a defendant to a nefense-
psychiatrist is almost certainly a certworthy issue. The diffi-
cult question is whether this case is an appropriate vehicle for 
resolving the issue. I divide the discussion into three parts: 
v 
1) whether the issue is certworthy; 2) whether Zant v. Stephens 
renders the error, if any, irrelevant; and 3) whether the claim 
has been defaulted under Wainwright v. Sykes. 
a. The Issue. In Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581 F.2~ 75, 80 (CA4 
1978), the court hel~ categorically that "faln incriminating 
statement made durinq a psychiatric examination cannot be used to 
prove a defendant's guilt, whether the defendant or the prosecu--
tor requested the examination •.. " The rationale for the CA4's 
holding is that a defendant cannot adequately explore psychologi-
cal defenses unless the psychiatric examiners are free to make a 
full inquiry into the circumstances of the offense or anv prior 
related offenses. Id., at 79. A defendant has an affirmative 




abridged, the court held, if its exercise were co~ditioned upon a 
waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege against seJf incrimina-
tion. Id., at 80. A number of other courts have reached a simi-
lar conclusion, locating the right variously in the Fifth, Sixth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e. _g_., United States v. 
Reifsteck, 535 F.2d 1030, 1034 n.l (CAB 1_976) (Fifth Amendment) 
(dicta); United States v. Alverez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1045-1047(1975) 
(Sixth Amendment: "The at tornev must be free to make an informer'! 
judgment with respect to the best course of the nefense without 
the inhibition of creating a potential qovernment witness."); 
Collins v. Augur, 428 F.Supp. 1079 (S.D. Iowa) (due process). 
See also, ABA Standards for Criminal ~ustice (mental health-
----------- ----------
criminal justice standards) 7-3.2. 
Although the rule announced by the CA4 in Gibson is clearly 
the prevailing view, at least one circuit has reached prec isel v 
the opposite result. In Smith v. Wainwright, 741 P.2d 1248, 
1258-1259 (CAll 1984), the court held that the state was tree to 
introduce uncounselea, unwarned statements made by a defendant to 
an examining psychiatrist as long as the psychiatrist was re-
tained by the defense. Relying on Bstelle v. Smith, 451 u.s. 454 
(1981), the court took the position--in direct conflict with the 
CA4 in Gibson--that the Constitution was implicated only if the 
psychiatrist was an agent of the state. 
In view of the apparent conflict in the circuits, the qener-
al importance of the issue, and the recurring nature of the oroh-
lem, I believe that the constitutionality of the qovernment' s 





a question worthy of this Court's attention. Mpst courts that 
I 
have faced the issue have concluden that such use is prohi bi teo 
if introduced to prove oui 1 t. Presumably, the logic of these 
~
holdings--read in light of Smith, 451 u.s., at 462-463, and Ake 
v. Oklahoma, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 1097 (1985)--would apply fully to 
the sentencing phase of a capital trial.l Last term the ~ourt 
recognized "that when the State has made defendant's mental con-
dition relevant to his criminal culpability and to the punishment 
he might suffer, the assistance of a psychiatrist may well be 
crucial to the nefendant's ability to marshal his defense." Ake, 
105 s.ct., at 1095. If the defendant is out to the choice of 
either censuring himself during his osychiatric examinatjon or 
divulging information that wi)l later be used to convict of sen-
tence him, the value of the psychiatric assistance will inevita-
bly be diminishecL Whether or how this forced choice rises to 
the level of a cons tit uti. ona l error is far from clear. In 1_ i ght 
of the confusion among the lower courts, however, the issue ap-
pears to warrant clarification in this Court.2 
1 The case for inadmissibility is even stronger where, as 
here, the defendant does not himself put his mental state in 
issue. As far as I can tell, Piles testified before the defense 
put on any witnesses at all nuring the sentencing phase. It also 
appears that Piles did not intend to put the defendant's mental 
state into issue during the sentencing phase. All of the 14 wit-
nesses he called were character witnesses. He only addressed the 
mental issue during his closing arqument after the psychiatric 
testimony had been admitted through the government's witnesses. 
2 I no not believe that the fact that Pugh told petr not 
to talk freely to Piles implies a "waiver" or in any other way 
undermines petr's claim. Tn fact, i.t highlights the problem. 
Because of the fear that the statements would be admittea, petr's 
own lawyer found it necessary to significantly curtai_l the pros-
(Footnote continued) 
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~Zant v. Stephens. The ~essentially as~$med t11at admis-
[? ---+t 
of Piles's testimony was constitutional error. Relying on sion 
V" Zant v. Stephens, however, it concluded, that the error was i_ r-
relevant since it only went to future dangerousness and since the 
jury had found another valid aggravating circumstance. 
I believe that the court's reliance on Step11ens was plainly 
incorrect. Under the CA4's reading of that oecision, any an~ all 
evidence, no matter how unconstitutionally derived, is admissible 
provided that the jury finds at least one valid aggravating cir-
cumstance. Whatever else Stephens may say, it simp] y t:loes not 
support this rather remarkable holding.3 The Stephens court did 
find that a death sentence imposed under Georgia law need not be 
overturned merelv because one of the statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances was later found to be unconstitutionally vague. But 
in reaching that conclusion, t 11e r.our t repeated 1 y stressed that 
the evidence introduced in support of the ultimately invalidated 
(Footnote 2 continued from previous page) 
pect of a meaningful exploration of possible psychiatric c'le-
fenses. Moreover, although petr did divulge t11e school bus inci-
dent, it is impossible to know whether or to what degree he cen-
sured his other comments during the interview. ~or do I consider 
the State's harmless error argument colora":>le. Puqh put on 14 
witnesses who testified to oetr' s moral character. In this con-
text, I doubt very much that admission of a statement that he han 
ripped the clothes off of a school gi_ rl and contemplated assault-
ing her could be considered harmless beyond a reasonable c'loubt. 
3 Under the CA4's reasoning, a statement elicited from the 
defendant at gunpoint would be admissible to show "future danger-
ousness" provided that the iury also found another aggravating 
circumstance, for example that the murder was committed nuring 
the course of a felony 
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aggravating circumstance was itself admissible. 4~2 u.s., at 886-,\ 
888. Clearly, if the admission of. Pi.les' tesimonv was error, 
Stephens pro vi des no bas is for disregarding i. t. 
We are left then with the question 
whet petr's failure to ~is properlv preserved obiection 
to forecloses federal habeas review. This 
question in turn divides into three inquiries: 1) whet~er the 
claim was defaulted at all; 2) if so, what standard should he 
applied to determine whether the claim is nonetheless reviewable; 
and 3) has petr satisfied that standard in this case. 
1. By definition, the claim would be defaulted only if the 
Virqinia Courts considered noncompliance with a procedural re-
qui rement to he a bar to further review in the state courts. At 
first glance, that appears to be the case. Vir qi ni a courts do 
ordinarily decline to revi. ew a claim in a post-conviction pro-
ceeding if it was not ~aised on appeal. See Slayton v. Parriqan, 
205 SE~d 680 (1974). See also, rr:'he Virginia r_.awver, Basic Prac-
tice Handbook ~14.2. It is well established, however, that non-
compliance with a state procedural rule will not bar federal ha-
be as review if the state courts themselves treated the claim as 
open. Arguably, that is the case here. The state habeas court 
did explicitly address petr's objection to the admission of the 
Piles's testimony. 'rhe difficulty is that it is all but impossi-
ble to tell from the opinion whether the court confronted the 
claim on the merits or merely addressed it in passing in the con-
text of rejecting petr's ineffective assistance claim. See ADP. 
69-71. Although the issue is close, I conclude that the state 
habeas court did not in fact resolve petr's con~titutional claim 
and that, t'I-Jerefore, the claim is not open on fe',~ eral haheas un-
less noncompliance with the state rule is somehow excused unc1er 
the applicable standard for evaluating procedural de~au1ts. 
2. The Court has never explicitly decided whether the Wain-
-=------·----·--------~ 
wright v. Svkes "cause and pre i ud ice" test or the Fay v. Noi a 
------.. --
"deliberate bypass" standard applies where, as here, a claim is 
properly preserved at trial but not raised on appeal. See Svkes, 
433 u.s., at 88 n.l2 (reserving question); but see Reed v. 'Ross, 
104 s.r:t. ?.901 (1984) (apparently assuming that Sykes applies). 
And the lower courts are in substantial disarray over the issue. 
See Note, 133 Colum. L. Rev. 975, 1002, n.l57 (1983); L. Yackle, 
Postconviction Remedies 131-132 (1983 supp.). In the circum-
stances of this case, however, I doubt anything turns on the dis-
tinction. Accordingly, I analyze the default under the "more 
demanding" cause-and-prei ud ice test of Svkes. Engle v. Isaacs, 
456 u.s. 107, 130 n.36 (1981). 
3. Prejudice is apparent, see supra note 2. 'T'hus , t '1-Je ------------
~ 
availability of habeas review turns on whether there was "cause 
---------------------
for" failure to appeal the constitutional claim. Assuming that 
the Tn;ffective assistance claim is insubstantial, 4 the only ius-
tification for counsel's omission is that at the time of the ap-
peal the claim was virtually certain to fail under Virginia law. 
4 Although the petn implicates the question whether inef-
fective assistance may constitute cause, it does so sufficientlv 






I do not pretend to understand precisely how Re1ed v. :Ross an-:'1 
II 
Engle suggesled that "per-/ Engle v. Isaac can be reconciled. 
ceived futility alone cannot constitute cause." Id. Reed, in 
contrast, held that "where a constitutional claim is so novel 
that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel, a 
defendant has cause for his failure to raise his claim in accord-
ance with applicable state procedures." J04 s.~t., at 2910. 'T'o 
the extent that the unlikelihooil of success does constitute 
"cause," petr can plausibly argue that his case falJ .s within the 
spirit, i_f not the letter of Reed. His trial and appeal Predated 
Ake, Estelle v. Smith, and other cases in th i. s Court that have 
recognized that psychiatric interviews can be critical, constitu-
tionally protected events in capital sentencing proceedings. 
More importantly, as the State habeas court expl ici tl y acknowl-
edged, app 71, under Virginia law petr's objection to the admis-
sion of Pile's testimony had no chance of success. See Gibson v. 
Commonwealth, 216 Va. 412 (1975), rev'd Gibson v. Zahradnic'<, 
supra. ~onetheless, with no shortage of ooubt, I believe that 
the case falls on the Engle rather than the Reed side of the 
line. Reed seems to be limited to instances in which counsel's 
failure to raise a claim is attributable not so much to the cer-
tainty of failure but to the fact that the right has vet to be 
"discovered" in the Constitution. Reed, 104 s.ct., at 2910 
(cause where counsel is "unaware of question's latent exist-
ence"). Undoubtedly, in Virginia in 1977 it would have been fu-
tile for petr to pursue his objection to the admission of Piles' 
testimony. But it is very hard to say that there was no "J egal 
.• 
.• -
basis" for his claim when an amicus di~ apparently make precisely 
l 
the argument petr now wishes to pursue on habea~. Moreover, in 
1975, two years before trial. , the CA3 had already adopted virtu-
ally the same position, petr now espouses. Alvarez, supra. Al-
though the issue is extremely clos~, I conclude that the claim 
has been defaulted. 
Because this is a capital case, because this is a first ha-
beas petition, and because the execution date is set for less -
than a week after conference, I have tried to l_ay the arguments 
out as fully as possible. In so doing, I have reached the dis-
tressing conclusion that the oetn Presents a certworthy issue 
but that the claim is not open for review on federal ~abeas. ~y 
habeas analysis is Potentially vulnerable in two respects. 
~ 
~it is not wholly clear that the state habeas court did not 
confront the issue raised in this petn. ~' it is certainly 
plausible to argue that the claim here is sufficently "novel" -that there was "cause" for failure to raise it • If my analysis 
.....____ 
is incorrect on eit~er of these points, I believe that the petn 
should be granted. For now, however, I am constrained to re~om-
mend: DENY. 
There is a response. 
IFP status is proper 
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85-5487 Smith v. Sielaff (CA4) 
MEMO TO FILE: 
This is a Virginia capital case in which Smith 
(petitioner) was convicted by a jury in 1977 for the 
capital murder and rape of a young woman. Guilt is 
conceded, and the only question involves the sentencing 
phase of the trial. The jury had before it the 
prosecution's claim that there were two separate 
aggravating circumstances, one of dangerousness and the 
other of vileness - the only two aggravating circumstances 
specified in the Virginia statute. The jury found 
separately with respect to each of these, that it alone 
merited imposition of the death penalty. 
The case comes to us after the usual panoply of 
prior litigation: (i) on the automatic appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Virginia provided by state law, the 
conviction and sentence were affirmed; (ii) we denied cert 
in 1979; (iii) on a state court petition for habeas 
corpus, in which petitioner claimed there had been 
ineffective assistance of counsel, the court held an 
evidentiary hearing and ruled against petitioner; (iv) 





both the magistrate and the DC found no merit in 
petitioner's claims and the petition was dismissed; and 
(v) CA4 affirmed the decision of the DC. The Court of 
Appeals considered several issues. The trial court had 
admitted testimony, at the sentencing phase, by Dr. Pile, 
a psychiatrist appointed by the Court at the request of 
the defendant. During Dr. Pile's examination, petitioner 
volunteered statements concerning an earlier rape attempt 
that CA4 characterized as "severely damaging to the 
defendant". At the time of the trial CA4 states that 
under Virginia law this testimony was properly admissible. 
In any event, counsel failed to object at trial, and did 
not present this issue on appeal to the Virginia Supreme 
Court. This is the basis for the claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
The state relies on Wainwright v. Sykes that 
imposes a burden on the defendant to show cause for and 
prejudice in the failure to raise an issue. CA4 expressed 
doubt as to whether or not counsel in fact had been guilty 
of ineffective assistance, but avoided this issue by 
deciding the appeal on the authority of Zant v. Stephens, 
462 u.s. 862 (1983). In that case, we stated: 
' ~ 
''\ I· 
"A death penalty supported by at least one valid 
aggravating circumstance need not be set aside . 
simply because another aggravated 
circumstance is 'invalid' in the sense that it 
is insufficient itself to support the death 
penalty." ld., at 884. 
As CA4 stated, the jury's verdict imposing the 
death sentence was supported by two separate and distinct 
grounds of aggravation: (a) dangerousness (i.e.' 
violence) and (b) vileness. The testimony of the 
psychiatrist concerned statements by the defendant as to 
prior rape or attempted rape. Moreover, the evidence in 
this case showed that defendant had been convicted of a 
prior rape, had served a term in the state penitentiary, 
and the psychiatrist had testified that defendant was a 
psychopath who did not recognize the difference between 
right and wrong. On the basis of all of these facts, the 
jury found that there was a likelihood that the defendant 
would continue to commit crimes - i.e. would be dangerous. 
The jury also found the second aggravating 
circumstance specified by Virginia law that can be 
summarized as a jury finding that the murder at issue was 
"outrageously or wantonly vile". The Court of Appeals 
stated: 





"The evidence presented 
showing of 'vileness' 
testimony in the guilt 
provided a basis for a 
was vile." 
to the jury supporting a 
was unchallenged. The 
phase of the case amply 
decision that the crime 
See, p. 164 of the Joint Appendix for CA4's 
summary of the details of this crime. No one can doubt 
that it was "vile". 
The Court of Appeals, relying on Zant v. 
Stephens, held that even if psychiatric evidence was 
improperly admitted and that it may have prejudiced 
defendant with respect to the finding of "dangerousness", 
the valid circumstance of the vileness of the crime was 
sufficient itself to support the death penalty. 
Subject to the views of my clerk, 1 am inclined 
to decide the case on the grounds relied upon by the Court 
of Appeals. The briefs of the parties - petitioner and 
the state - as well as the amicus brief of the American 
Psychiatric Association, are devoted primarily to the 
question involving the admissibility of the incriminating 
statements made by the defendant to the psychiatrist. 1 
am inclined to agree with defendant and amicus that a 
psychiatrist provided by the state at the request of the 
defendant should be viewed, in effect, as a "consultant" 
" t 
who was duty bound not to divulge statements made that 
might incriminate the patient. The state argues that even 
if the testimony should not have been admitted, the 
failure of counsel to object at trial or to raise the 
question before the Supreme Court of Virginia was a 
procedural default under Wainwright v. Sykes, and that 
petitioner had shown neither cause nor prejudice. 
As noted above, 1 am inclined to follow CA4 in 
not deciding either of these issues. Rather, we can 
assume that defendant is correct as to the TC's error in 
admitting this testimony, and also that it may have 
adversely affected petitioner with respect to the finding 
of "dangerousness". This still leaves the separate and 
independent finding that the rape and murder were "vile" 
within the meaning of the Virginia statute. Under my 
understanding of Zant v. Stephens, this is sufficient to 
sustain the death sentence. 
Petitioner's brief, apparently written very 
well - by a professor at u.va. School of Law, argues that 
CA4 misconstrued Zant. It is argued that where 
constitutional error was committed with respect to one of 
more aggravating circumstances, the fact that an otherwise 
proper finding of a different factor is not sufficient to 
support the death sentence. Subject to the views of my 
clerk, 1 am not persuaded by petitioner's brief. 
If my clerk is in accord with the above views, a 
very brief memo will suffice. 1 should add that this is 
being dicta ted at horne. 1 do not have our decision in 
Zant v. Stephens and am relying on my recollection as well 





To: Mr. Justice Powell February 28, 1986 
From: Bob 
No. 85-5487 
MICHAEL MARNELL SMITH v. MURRAY 
CAPITAL CASE 
To be argued, Tuesday, March 4, 1986 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
When a court orders a pretrial mental evaluation of a capi-
tal defendant upon defense request to enable counsel to explore 
psychiatric defenses or claims in mitigation, is it constitution-
ally permissible for the prosecution to call the expert to 
'-- testify about incriminating statements made by defendant during 
the evaluation when the statements are offered for the 'sole pur-
~ 
pose of proving an aggravating circumstance and are not 1 relevant 
to any claim in mitigation raised by the defense. 
Whether the error here was insignificant under this Court's 
decision in Zant v. Stephens because another aggravating circum-
stance was found in this case. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Petr was convicted and sentenced to death on November 3, 
1977 for the rape and murder of Audrey Weiler on May 23, 1977. 
According to petr's confession he met Weiler on a beach near his 
home when he stopped to help her remove briars from her feet. He 
then grasped her arm and walked with her to a wooded area near 
the water, pulled out a knife and asked her to take her clothes 
off. She complied, while protesting. Smith had intercourse with 
Mrs. Weiler and then starting choking her with both hands. He 
then dragged her into the water and submerged her head for sever-
al seconds. He subsequently stabbed her in the back with his 
knife. He left the body and returned home. The medical examiner 
concluded that the immediate cause of death was drowning, though 
the stab wounds and strangulation could also have caused death. 
Prior to trial petr' s counsel, David F. Pugh, asked that 
Smith be examined to determine whether he was competent to stand 
trial. Later at petr's state habeas hearing, Mr. Pugh stated that 
prior to trial he had also wanted assistance of a psychiatrist to 
help him explore claims in exculpation or mitigation based on 
Smith's mental condition. This was his desire, notwithstanding 
i 
that the trial court's order was apparently limited to t~e compe-
tency issue. (J.A. 128). After being dissatisfied with the first 
evaluation, Pugh requested the court to appoint a private psychi-
atrist, Dr. Wendell J. Pile, to examine petr, which it did. Mr 
Pugh had advised petr not to discuss the offense with which he 
was charged or any prior offense with anyone but himself and co-
counsel. At the outset of the first psychiatric evaluation, a Dr. 
Dimi tr is, also warned petr that anything he said could be used 
against him in a court of law. Dr. Pile said nothing to petr con-
cerning the use that could be made of his statements. In his let-
ter to court and counsel, as was the practice in Virginia, Dr. 
Pile told of an incident related by petr, in which he stated that 
some 13 years earlier when he was a teenager, petr tore the 
clothes off a girl who rode the school bus he drove before decid-
ing not to rape her. 
At the sentencing hearing the prosecution put on four wit-
nesses. Dr. Pile was called to testify to the school bus inci-
dent. Petr's counsel objected, but the objection was overruled. 
At the state habeas hearing, Mr. Pugh testified that he would not 
have called Dr. Pile because his testimony would have been hurt-
ful to petr. Pugh nonetheless cross-examined Dr. Pile and wound 
up eliciting his diagnosis of petr as having a "sociopathic per-___ ......,..., --- -------
sonality, sexual deviation, rape." The prosecution next called 
~ "---" -
Dr. Dimitris, who testified that petr has an "inadequate person-
ality disorder." During Dr. Dimitris' testimony two jurors asked 






Dr. Pile. Petr's parole officer testified as to petr's prior 
\........ ~ 
' rape conviction, and an investigator read petr's confes~ion. The 
defense c~ed 12 character witnesses. In ~ the 
prosecutor relied on Dr. Pile's description of the school bus --- - ------~ . ..---.....__,_-
incJ_d~~t, as well as Dr .:~osis. The jury deliberated 
for only about four hours and returned a death penalty finding 
both statutory aggravating circumstances: a probability that f3oli.. 
lfJ &Z-f ~~ pet~ould commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute ;r~~ 
a continuous serious threat to society and that his conduct in 
committing th~ffense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horri-
ble or inhuman, in that it involved torture and aggravated bat-
tery to the victim. 
On direct appeal defense counsel did not assign as error the r~~ 
admission of Dr. Pile's testimony, although the issue was dis-~ 
cussed in a University of Virginia Amicus brief. Petr alleged in 
both his state and federal habeas petitions that Dr. Pile's tes-
timony at the sentencing proceeding was constitutionally imper-
missible. They both ruled that the claim had been forfeited, on 
grounds of procedural default, because Mr. Pugh had failed to 
raise the issue on appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court. The CA4 
affirmed the federal DC's denial of the writ. It assumed without 
deciding that petr had demonstrated "cause" and "prejudice," be-
cause it found that even invalidating one aggravating circum-
stance, the other circumstance was sufficient to justify the 
death sentence under this Court's decision in Zant v. Stephens, 
462 u.s. 862 (1983). 
II. DISCUSSION 
though able to show pr judice, has been unable to show a valid 
cause for not raising t is claim on direct appeal to the Virginia 
Supreme Court. An affi mance on this basis avoids reaching the 
merits on the psychiatric testimony. I am thoroughly persuaded 
that this type of use of a psychiatrist's testimony is unconsti-
tutional. Finally, a on the procedural bar point avoids 
the issue of whether finding of one aggravating factor 
alone will sustain a sentence where evidence admitted to 
support another factor is e eluded on the basis of the ruling on 
appeal. 
1. Procedural Bar 
In order to avoid the bar in this case, petr sug-
gests that the "cause and requirement is somehow de-
serving of a different applicat'on when the petr fails to raise 
an issue on appeal, This argument is 
squarely rejected in No. 84-1554, which is 
currently in circulation. See also Reed v. Ross, 83 L. Ed. 2d 1 
(1984). In addition Murray rejects the claim that mere inadver-
tence can suffice to constitute cause, and this Court declined to 
grant cert in this case on the issue of whether petr received 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Although the representation 
here may have been lacking in that the defense was not preserved, 
it is difficult to conclude that that error alone constituted 










.&.. ~ J - - .. 
There is little vitality to an argument that the claim here 
~ 
was so novel that there was no reasonable basis in exi'$ting law 
to make it, in light of the fact that respondent argues so 
forcefully that upon doing some research it was virtually impos- •. 
sible not to become aware of the issue. Respondent points to two 
district court cases reported in the Criminal Law Reporter, ex-
tensive law review commentary, and to the number of circuit 
courts that had provided protection in the similar context in 
which a state compels a psychiatric exam. In addition, I noted at 
least one 1975 circuit case out of the CA3 that expressly ad-
dressed the issue here. There is no doubt that the general sub-
ject of psychiatric testimony against an accused was one widely 
considered by courts with constitutional overtones. I conclude 
that the claim here is not a worthy of supporting a 
finding that petr had "cause" not to raise it on appeal. Final-
ly, I do not believe that the fact that the issue was raised be-
fore the Virginia Supreme Court in an amicus brief, or the fact ~ 
that the state habeas court in considering the ineffective as-
sistance of counsel claim considered it, require a different re-
sult. 
This is arguably a harsh result because a Virginia Supreme 
Court case Gibson v. Commonwealth, 219 S.E.2d 845 (Ca. 1975), had 
already rejected, in a similar setting, an argument that use of a 
defendant's statements to a psychiatrist violated the Fifth 
Amendment proscription against compelling self-incrimination. 
This was so, it ruled, because there had been no compulsion. 
Thus, it is not surprising that defense counsel did not see the 
J..- - J-- • • 
usefulness of raising such a claim before the Virgini1a Supreme 
,; 
Court. He should, however, have been aware that the ort+y way to J 
preserve the claim for later review would be to raise it first. 
Within the doctrines established by this Court, I do not see a 
way around the procedural bar here. 
2. The Psychiatric Testimony 
There is no question that amicus American Psychological As-
sociation is correct when it asserts plainly that: 
"[I]f the defendant is not willing to speak freely 
and candidly with the mental health professional, the 
professional will frequently be unable to conduct the 
type of individualized assessment of the defendant's 
mental condition that would be appropriate to the capi-
tal sentencing phase." 
APA Amicus Brief, at 10. I am further persuaded that a de-
fendant' s Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of 
counsel at trial is denied when counsel cannot consult a psychia-
tr ist to investigate possible avenues of defense without being 
assured that statements made by the defendant in the investiga-
tion of those possible areas of defense are not available to the 
prosecutor simply by calling the psychiatrist to the stand. This 
right could also be supported by the Fourteenth Amendment, by 
saying that it is fundamentally unfair to deprive a defendant of 
a right to defend himself by allowing the prosecution to call to 
the stand the psychiatrist consulted by the defendant. Although 
I think either of these grounds support petr here, I lean slight-
ly towards the Sixth Amendment rationale, because the rule sought 
by petr can be closely tied to the trial counsel's responsibility 
to investigate available defenses. See Amicus Brief 
Department of the Public Advocate, at 3v of N~w Jersey ll 'I 
Respondent's contrary arguments are just silly. To say that 
it is somehow enough for a defendant to know that statements made 
to a psychiatrist can be disclosed, betrays a fundamental misun-
derstanding of the process of psychological evaluation, as point-
ed out in the briefs. The best argument for respondent's view-
point would be that the need for such a rule does not necessarily 
mean that there must be a constitutional basis for it. Many 
states have apparently already regulated the area by statute. As 
noted above, however, I agree that the petr's view is supported 
by the constitution. 
In Zan this Court upheld a death sentence, 
despite the fact that one of the statutory aggravating factors 
supporting the imposition of the death penalty had been struck 
down by the Georgia Supreme Court because the factor failed to 
provide an adequate basis for distinguishing a murder case in 
1 Respondent contends that petr has shifted his theory and that 
this court should not consider it. It is true that petitioner's 
earlier submissions, such as in the state habeas proceeding1 
focused more on the failure of Dr. Pile to warn petr that what 
was said could be used against him, and that the claim was based 
on the Fifth Amendment. In denying his state habeas petition, 
however, Judge Carneal considered an analogy to the Sixth 
Amendment argument made in the CA4's decision in Gibson v. 
Zahradnick, based on an argument that defendant should not have 
to sacr1fice his Sixth Amendment right to explore psychological ~ 
defenses. Assuming the petr could get over the Wainwright \ ~ 
hurdle, I do not think the Court is barred from considering 
whether the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment supports a claim 
broader than the mere failure to warn . 
. . 
which the death penalty may be imposed from one in which such a 
penalty may not be imposed. Id., at 886. This Court u~held the 
death penalty because one other aggravating factor was found and 
because the evidence admitted to support the invalidated factor 
was admissible despite the fact that the factor that it tended to 
support was invalid. In making that decision, this Court relied 
on certain characteristics of the Georgia sentencing scheme: 
"A case may not [become one] in which the death 
penalty is authorized unless at least one statutory "'< 
aggravating circumstance is found. However, this~ · 
is passed regardless of the number of statutory aggra-
vating circumstances found, so long as there is at 
least one. Once beyond this~~ the case enters the 
area of the factfinder's discretion, in which all the 
facts and circumstances of the case determine, in terms 
of our;-::-me t;.aphor, whether or not the case passes the 
third ~~~nd into the area in which the death penal-
ty is 1mposed." 
Zant, 462 u.s., at 872 (quoting Georgia Supreme Court in 
response to certified question). In simple language the jury 
must find one aggravating circumstance; once it does that it re- tC~f 
turns to a consideration of the facts and evidence to exercise -
its discretion whether to impose the death penalty. 
The Virginia statute is modeled on the Georgia statute. 
Reply Brief of Petitioner, at 8 n. 9. Nonetheless, the current 
case is plainly distinguishable from Zant. Assuming a holding 
that the psychiatrist's testimony was constitutionally inadmissi-
ble, then, unlike the situation in Zant, the jury was exposed to 
-- ----------
-
it The critical ~-
factor, then, is not that one aggravating circumstance remains,~ 
but rather that the evidence offered to support the second aggra-
vating circumstance was simply inadmissible. Indeed, in Zant, 
.. 
the Georgia Supreme Court noted that "a different result might be 
\ 
reached if the failed circumstance had been supported by ' evidence 
not otherwise admissible .... " Id., at 873. This Court later 
reiterated that same point. Id., at 890. 
Because this case is distinguishable from Zant, and because 
the admission of the school bus story violated the petr's Sixth 
Amendment rights, then the proper analysis of this death convic-
'-- __. 
tion is, as the petr contends, Chapman harmless error analysis 
Whether the error here was harmless is a close call, and 
always uncomfortable with in a death case because of the inheren 
difficulty at the sentencing phase of knowing whether an 
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." In addition, petr here -claims that only because the prosecutor called Dr. Pile, did} 
pe~se~ stu~ble into~gi~~~on w~h 
elicited Dr. Pile's diagnosis. That complicates this issue some-
what, although I am reluctant to impute the defense 
error in this regard to the prosecutor. 
Respondent contends that the evidence was insignificant when 
compared with the other evidence. The Commonwealth introduced 
evidence that the petr had previously been convicted of rape in 
1973. The evidence further established that Petitioner had been 
paroled from the penitentiary on that charge less than four 
months prior to the rape and murder of Mrs. Weiler. Also before 
the jury was petitioner's confession which contained the state-
ment that he killed the victim because he was afraid of returning 
to prison. In addition, the heinous nature of the crime was be-
fore the jury. Further, it is doubtful that the jury would have 
---? 
.1.--·::~ - --· 
been influenced to any great degree by an incident that happened 
\ 
in petr's teen years, some 13 years earlier. Finally, ~here were 
only three assing references to the school bus incident in some ____ ....___...__.----..,___ .. __...,__ - ......__ --·~· ·-..., 
fourteen pages of argument. Thus, according to respondent, it is 
easy to find dangerousness even without the school bus incident, 
and thus the conviction should be upheld even under a harmless 
error analysis. 
Petr contends that the information revealed here was in no 
sense cumulative. Rather, in addition to the previous rape con-
viction, the school bus incident was introduced to provide an 
additional factual predicate for the prediction of future danger-
ousness. In addition, the prosecutor made reference to it in his 
closing argument. I do not think that, in light of the other 
things going against defendant, there is a reasonable possibility 
--------· -- -------- '-. - - _,_ 
that the tainted evidence here might have contributed to the 
--------~~--------~--~~~-
jury's decision to impose a death sentence. This is a close 
call, and for that reason I have set out the arguments of both 
sides fairly clearly on this point. 
III. CONCLUSION 
I recommend that you vote to affirm the opinion of the CA4 ' ~ 
on the ground that petr's claim here is barred by the doctrine of 
Wainwright v. Sykes. In the event the Court chooses to do this, ..._,_, 
~-r 
announcement of this case should be made on the same day as Mur- /.k4--JA c... 
~ v. Carrier, supra, insofar as issues decided in that case z~r -
clearly have an impact on this one. In the event the procedural ~ 
u,..,_ 
bar is not a barrier, I recommend you find that the error here ~~ 
was harmless. 
~. ~k,..,_ 3/z. 
g s-- 5"' ¥- g 7 ~ v ~ ( c /l 4 - l/4 11-1-<~ ,.,#4.,-c,.; ~ 
(~~~1+/<C) . 
Ci+l-~ 
I~ 1l.A.. ~. "Jt.c q vj ~ ~ ~1-M._M.~.~ ..... ·~. 
{9-,dyQ ~
oj •' 'ia ... a-1 ~k~c4--tf ~~ ~ ~ 
hr a..~~~~~~h,TCd 
~~· 7-d-v. J~~~~ 
a..e~ ~ ~c~~~t ~ 
~1'-l-.vu..l- x-~7n..t~ 
~ jj 's- ~. 5~ Jlf1 4-- !;-' tr/  
~.~~~ . 
b  .... 
/ (11:-)P~~:~~~~ d•f•· .. ~~ 
~ ~hi..,..~ ~rtC~~---~~ to 
IY v ~ ~ ~ /JU)I- t..u.~  ·~ ~ 
~ ~ J..i;,.-.. "- H<--t"" 1-lu.i. htlu "'( ~..,._., ~ 
~~~ -41-~ PAt-~ d( v'~ . .73~1- ~ ~~~~ .... 
~J'( ~ . ._:;; 
~ y· v~ ~r::;. z::;;:_:;::::; L';~¢':.::::.:~ 
~)~~~·~· ~~c,Jii~~r 
~ ~-'·"'"' .ty ~ ~d4.4J~l-  l!Jt!::J 
~61~ . ~ P];!;!-~~ ~
~· ~~~~~~~~ 
~~ .... ;~ ,..u.c..~ .,..,.,.w·•·~s A<.G-c.l-4~~~ 
(M.#4.Iv<~~ ~ ~~ ~~~- ~1~ 
~ r ~-«.~ ""'-•_,( ~ t..-c. a .. c:o/  
~ 1- nw.:.... ...e-v. .;-~k..l.. r4c- r--~t.· 't '¥ HeA. "'~ v 
~;.,y. /4 ~.·~~~~~- _...~ ... m,/4 P-e-w,~ 
-~a~.L~; .... ,• ~~~~.Ld~A..~~ ... 
• ..,.,  % --r 
(c)£.,...y~~. 
}c.~~~~~~~~. 
~~-5487 Smith v. Murray ' . 'I Argu;ed 3/4/86 
"'·' 
~ i.!..!_ ( p,e.-l-v--~UJ · ~; ,:,, 
J a--1- ~~--~- ~- ·~ 
~ ~. 11-vz... ~ t.-1-~~. 
___... 
rt~~~~~ 
~ ~ 4 t!iJII!I!I-  ~ 
~/~_A~~~ 
~~f~~~. 
( ~ 4 w ~ 14 ~ wJAv cA t/-'t' 
~~~~~~ 
~~~~~ 
1-1::>~ ~t~') . 
s 'D tc ~?f..t4!-h ~ 
~ ~ 'l--Uet~t ~ 
~~~(_~~ 
k ~~k-cL cs(o-v~ h ~ 
~1-~. 1"2..-~X-~~ ~ 
pfl 4 -s- "1 ~-
(_ ~~(~W-w-e.~~~~ 
-K~ ( t2AA..~ AO... va_j . 
. ~ 
.. ,.IJ t, ' 
tt..-1- /l..~ If/~) ?~~(~  
~)-*~~~~~~ 
 ~ 













No. 85-5487 Smith v. Murray Conf. 3/7/86 
The Chief Justice ~ ~ 
·. ~ 
4/~IJ- L/ >y ~ ~ 
~~~fr-~1-~ ~ 
Justice Brennan /~ 
Justice White 1if $&,., Uft!_~ 
•. t 
Justice Marshall 






the- .L<.~ tPf /--u-0 ~ . .S_.!!.(__ 
~ (74)~. 
q~~ h!J ~ ~ 
c:t.+~l-
~ 
' .. ' .. 
J. 
Justice Rehnquist 4/ ~ 






















From: Justice O'Connor 
Circulated: __ A_P_f<_4_· ____ _ 
Recirculated: _________ .__ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-5487 
MICHAEL MARNELL SMITH, PETITIONER v. ED- (S -L-L- V1 /f 
WARD W. MURRAY, DIRECTOR, VIRGINIA r 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
[April -, 1986] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether and, if so, under 
what circumstances, a prosecutor may elicit testimony from a 
mental health professional concerning the content of an inter-
view conducted to explore the possibility of presenting psy-
chiatric defenses at trial. We also agreed to review the 
Court of Appeals' determination that any error in the admis-
sion of the psychiatrist's evidence in this case was irrelevant 
under the holding of Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862 (1983). 
On examination, however, we conclude that petitioner de-
faulted his underlying constitutional claim by failing to press 
it before the Virginia Supreme Court on direct appeal. Ac-
cordingly, we decline to address the merits of petitioner's 
claims and affirm the judgment dismissing the petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus. 
I 
Following a jury trial, petitioner was convicted of the May, 
1977 murder of Audrey Weiler. According to his confession, 
petitioner encountered Ms. Weiler in a secluded area near his 
home and raped her at knifepoint. Fearing that her testi-
mony could send him back to prison, he then grabbed her by 
the neck and choked her until she fell unconscious. When he 
realized that she was still alive, he dragged her into a nearby 
river, submerged her head, and repeatedly stabbed her with 
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his knife. A subsequent medical examination indicated that 
the death was attributable to three clusters of lethal injuries: 
asphyxia from strangulation, drowning, and multiple stab 
wounds. 
Prior to the trial, petitioner's appointed counsel, David 
Pugh, had explored the possibility of presenting a number of 
psychiatric defenses. Towards that end, Mr. Pugh re-
quested that the trial court appoint a private psychiatrist, 
Dr. Wendell Pile, to conduct an examination of petitioner. 
Aware that psychiatric reports were routinely forwarded to 
the court and that such reports were then admissible under 
Virginia law, Mr. Pugh had advised petitioner not to discuss 
any prior criminal episodes with anyone. App. 134. See 
Gibson v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 412, 219 S. E. 2d 845 
(1975). Although that general advice was intended to apply 
to the forthcoming psychiatric examination, Mr. Pugh later 
testified that he "did not specifically tell [petitioner] not to 
say anything to Doctor Pile about the offense or the of-
fenses." App. 132. During the course of the examination, 
Dr. Pile did in fact ask petitioner both about the murder and 
about prior incidents of deviant sexual conduct. Tr. of State 
Habeas Hearing 19. Although petitioner initially declined to 
answer, he later stated that he had once torn the clothes off a 
girl on a school bus before deciding not to carry out his origi-
nal plan to rape her. App. 44. That information, together 
with a tentative diagnosis of "Sociopathic Personality; Sexual 
Deviation (rape)," was forwarded to the trial court, with 
copies sent both to Mr. Pugh and to the prosecutor who was 
trying the case for the Commonwealth. I d., at 43-45. At 
no point prior to or during the interview did Dr. Pile inform 
petitioner that his statements might later be .used against 
him or that he had the right to remain silent and to have 
counsel present if he so desired. Id., at 90. Cf. Estelle v. 
Smith, 451 U. S. 454 (1981). 
At the sentencing phase of the trial, the Commonwealth 
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Dr. Pile described the incident on the school bus. Tr. 
934-935. On cross examination, he repeated his earlier con-
clusion that petitioner was a "sociopathic personality." /d., 
at 936. Mter examining a second psychiatrist, the Common-
wealth introduced petitioner's criminal record into evidence. 
It revealed that he had been convicted of rape in 1973 and 
had been paroled from the penitentiary on that charge less 
than four months prior to raping and murdering Ms. Weiler. 
The defense then called 14 character witnesses, who testified 
that petitioner had been a regular church goer, a member of 
the choir, a conscientious student in highschool, and a good 
soldier in Vietnam. After lengthy deliberation, the jury rec-
ommended that petitioner be sentenced to death. 
Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence to the 
Supreme Court of Virginia. In his brief he raised thirteen 
separate claims, including a broad challenge to the constitu-
tionality of Virginia's death penalty provisions, objections to 
several of the trial court's evidentiary rulings, and a chal-
lenge to the exclusion of a prospective juror during voir dire. 
Petitioner did not assign any error concerning the admission 
of Dr. Pile's testimony. At a subsequent state post-convic-
tion hearing, Mr. Pugh explained that he had consciously de-
cided not to pursue that claim after determining that "Vir-
ginia case law would [not] support our position at that 
particular time." App. 143. Various objections to the Com-
monwealth's use of Dr. Pile's testimony were raised, how--ever, in a brief filed b Amicus Curiae Post-Conviction As-
sistance Project o the mvers1ty o Virginia Law School. 
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction and 
sentence in all respects. vSmith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 
455, -- S. E. 2d -- (1977). In a footnote, it noted that, ) 
pursuant to a rule of the court, it had considered only those 
arguments advanced by~ Amicus that concerned errors 
specifically assigned by the defendant himself. I d., at 460 
n. 1,-- S. E. 2d, at--, n. 1. Accordingly, it did not ad-
dress. any issues concerning the prosecution's use of the psy-
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chiatric testimony. This Court denied the subsequent peti-
tion for certiorari, which, again, did not urge the claim that 
admission of Dr. Pile's testimony violated petitioner's rights 
under the Federal Constitution. 441 U. S. 967 (1979). 
In 1979, petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in the 
Circuit Court for the City of Wil~he County of 
James City. For the first time since the trial, he argued that 
the admission of Dr. Pile's testimolly'viO'lated his privilege 
against self-incrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Federal Constitution. The court ruled, 
however, that petitioner had forfeited the claim by failing to 
press it in earlier proceedings. At a subsequent evidentiary 
hearing, conducted solely on the issue of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel, the Court heard testimony concerning the 
reasons underlying Mr. Pugh's decision not to pursue the 
Fifth Amendment claim on appeal. On the basis of that tes-
timony, the court found that Pugh and his assistant had re-
searched the question, but had determined that the claim was 
unlikely to succeed. Thus, the court found, "counsel exer-
cised reasonable judgment in deciding not to preserve the ob-
jection on appeal, and . . . this decision resulted from in-
formed, professional deliberation." App. to Pet. for Cert. 
71. Petitioner appealed the denial of his habeas petition to 
the Virginia Supreme Court, contending that the Circuit 
Court had erred in finding"his objection to the admission of 
Dr. Pile's testimony had been defaulted. The Supreme 
Court declined to accept the appeal, 221 Va. cxliii, -- S. E. 
2d -- (1981), and we again denied certiorari. 454 U. S. 
1128 (1981). 
Having exhausted state remedies, petitioner sought a writ 
of habeas corpus in .the United States lli§!.rict Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia.l n aE_ ~u~o!der, the 
court denied the petition, holding t11attheob}eciTon t the ad-
mission o Dr. 1 e's estlmony was "c~ under 
this Court's decision in Wain i ht v kes, 433 U. S. 72 
(1977). App. 158. In reaching that conclusion, the district 
I : f 
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judge noted that "the default resulted not from the trial at-
torney's ignorance or inadvertance, but because of a delib-
erate tactical decision." I d. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, but 
on different grounds. Smith v. Procunier, 769 F. 2d 170 
(1985). Finding it unnecessary to rely on procedural default 
or to address the merits of the substantive constitutional 
claim, the court held that admission of Dr. Pile's testimony, 
even if erroneous, could not be the basis for invalidating peti-
tioner's sentence. It noted that the jury had relied on two dis-
tinct aggravating factors in its decision to recommend the 
death penalty. The psychiatric testimony, however, only 
bore on one of those factors, the likelihood that petitioner 
would "constitute a continuing serious threat to society." 
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Tr. at 1102. 
In that circumstance, the Court of Appeals believed, our de-
cision in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862, 884 (1982) required 
the conclusion that the error, if any, was irrelevant to the 
overall validity of the sentence. We granted certiorari, --
U. S. -- (1985), and now af the authority of our de- '? 
cision in Murray v. Carrie , ante, 
~
II 
Under Virginia law, failure to raise a claim on direct appeal 
from a criminal conviction ordinarily bars consideration of 
that claim in any subsequent state proceeding. See, e. g., 
Coppola v. Warden of the Virginia State Penitentiary, --
Va. --, 282 S. E. 2d 10 (1981); Slayton v. Parrigan, 215 
Va. 25, 205 S. E. 2d 680 (1974). In the present case, the 
Virginia courts have enforced that rule by declining to con-
sider petitioner's objection to the admission of Dr. Pile's tes-
timony, a claim concededly not included in his initial appeal 
from his conviction and sentence. Consistent with our ear-
lier intimations in Reed ~· R 468 U. S. --, --, we 
held in Murray v. Carrier, upra, at a federal habeas court 
must evaluate appellate s under the same standards 
6 
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"[D]efense counsel may not make a tactical decision to 
forgo a procedural opportunity-for instance, to object 
at trial or to raise an issue on appeal-and then when he 
discovers that the tactic has been unsuccessful, pursue 
an alternative strategy in federal court. The encour-
agement of such conduct by a federal court on habeas 
corpus review would not only offend generally accepted 
principles of comity, but would undermine the accuracy 
and efficiency of the state judicial system to the detri-
i 
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ment of all concerned. Procedural defaults of this na-
ture are, therefore, inexcusable, and cannot qualify as 
'cause' for purposes of federal habeas corpus review." 
468 U. S., at -- (internal quotations and citations 
omitted)." 
Here the record unambiguously reveals that petitioner's 
counsel ob"ecte o the a misswn of r. i e s testimony at -1-~  
trial and then conscious e ected not to pursue t at claim be-
fore the Virgm1a upreme Court. e asis for that deci-
sion was counsel's perception that the claim had little chance 
of success in the Virginia courts. With the benefit of hind-
sight, petitioner's counsel in this Court now contends that 
this perception proved to be incorrect. Cf. Gibson v. 
Zahradnick, 581 F. 2d 75 (CA4 1978) (repudiating reasoning 
of Gibson v. Commonwealth, supra). Even assuming that 
to be the case, however, a state's subsequent acceptance of 
an argument deliberately abandoned on direct appeal is irrel-
evant to the question whether the default should be excused 
on federal habeas. Indeed, it is the very prospect that a 
state court "may decide, on reflection, that the contention is 
valid" that undergirds the established rule that "perceived 
futility alone cannot constitute cause," Engle v. Isaac, 456 
U. S. 107, 130 & 130 n. 36 (1982); for "[a]llowing criminal de-
fendants to deprive the state courts of [the] opportunity" to 
reconsider previously rejected constitutional claims is funda-
mentally at odds with the principles of comity that animate 
Sykes and its progeny. !d., at 130. 
Notwithstanding the deliberate nature of the decision not 
to pursue his objection to Dr. Pile's testimony on appeal-a 
course of conduct virtually fatal to any effort to satisfy Syke's 
"cause" .requirement-petitioner contends that the default 
should be excused because Mr. Pugh's decision, though delib-
erate, was made in ignorance. Had he investigated the 
claim more fully, petitioner maintains, "it is inconceivable 
that he would have concluded that the claim was without 
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merit or that he would have failed to raise it." Reply Brief 
for Petitioner 3. 
The argument is squarely foreclosed by our decision in ) 
Carrier, which holds that "the mere fact that counsel faile to 
recognize the factual or lega asis for a clmm, or failed to 
ra c · esp1 e re 1z1 g 1t, do~stitute 
cau~r ~:.Jn~ea_gr~a_e u t. Ante, at --. See also 
Engle vTsaclc, supra, 45"6 U. S., at 133-34. Nor can it seri-
ously be maintained that the decision not to press the claim 
on appeal was an error of such magnitude that it rendered 
counsel's performance constitutionally deficient under the 
test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). 
Carrier reaffirmed that "the right to effective assistance of 
counsel . . . may in a particular case be violated by even an 
isolated error . . . if that error is sufficiently egregious and 
prejudicial." Ante, at --; see also United States v. 
Cronic, 466 U. S. 648, 657, n. 20 (1984). But counsel's delib-
erate decision not to pursue his objection to the admission of 
Dr. Piles' testimony falls far short of meeting that rigorous 
standard. After conducting a vigorous defense at both the 
guilt and sentencing phases of the trial, counsel surveyed the 
extensive transcript, researched a number of claims, and de-
cided that, under the current state of the law, thirteen were 
worth pursuing on direct appeal. This process of "winnow-
ing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on" those 
more likely to prevail, far from being evidence of incompe-
tence, is the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy. Jones 
v. Barnes, 463 U. S. 745, 751-752 (1983). It will often be the 
case that even the most informed counsel will fail to antici-
pate a state appellate court's willingness to reconsider a prior 
holding or will underestimate the likelihood that a federal ha-
beas court will repudiate an established state rule. But, as 
Strickland v. Washington made clear, "[a] fair assessment of 
attorney performance requires that every effort be made to 
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct 
the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to 
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evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." 
466 U. S., at 689. Viewed in light of Virginia law at the time 
Mr. Pugh submitted his opening brief to the Virginia 
Supreme Court, the decision not to pursue his objection to 
the admission of Dr. Piles' testimony fell well within the 
"wide range of professionally competent assistance" required 
under the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. 
ld., at 690. 
Nor can petitioner rely on the novelty of his legal claim as 
"cause" for noncompliance with Virginia's rules. See Reed 
v. Ross, supra, at--, ("[W]here a constitutional claim is so 
novel that its legal basis is not available to counsel, a defend-
ant has cause for his failure to raise the claim in accordance 
with applicable state procedures.") Petitioner contends that 
this Court's decisions in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454 
(1981), and Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. - (1985), which 
were decided well after the affirmance of his conviction and 
sentence on direct appeal, lend support to his position that 
Dr. Pile's testimony should have been excluded. But as a 
comparison of Reed and Engle makes plain, the question is 
not whether subsequent legal developments have made coun-
sel's task easier, but whether at the time of the default the 
claim was "available" at all. As petitioner has candidly con-
ceded, various forms of the claim he now advances had been 
percolating in the lower courts for years at the time of his 
original appeal. Brieffor Petitioner 20-21 n. 12; Reply Brief 
for Petitioner 3. Moreover, in this very case, an Amicus be-
fore the Virginia Supreme Court specifically argued that ad-
mission of Dr. Pile's testimony violated petitioner's rights 
under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Brief for Post Con-
viction Assistance Project of the University of Virginia Law 
School as Amicus Curiae 53-62. Under these circum-
stances, it simply is not open to argue that the legal basis of 
the claim petitioner now presses on federal habeas was un-
available to counsel at the time of the direct appeal. 
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We conclude, therefore, that petitioner has not carried his 
burden of showing cause for noncompliance with Virginia's 
rules of procedure. That determination, however, does not 
end our inquiry. As wenute<tillEngle a~ed in 
Ca~n appropriate cases' the principles or comity and 
finality that inform the concepts of cause and prejudice 'must 
yield to the imperative of correcting a fundame~lly unjy_st 
incarceration."' Murray v. Carrier, ante, at--, quoting 
E~saac, 456 U.S., at 135. Accordingly, "where a 
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the convic- vr---
tion of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court 
may grant the writ even Intlie aosence of a showing of cause 
for the procedural default." Murray v. Carrier, ante, at 
We acknowledge that the concept of "actual," as distinct 
from "legal," innocence does not translate easily into the con-
text of an alleged error at the sentencing phase of a trial on a 
capital offense. Nonetheless, we think it clear on this record 
that application of the cause and prejudice test will not result 
in a "fundamental miscarriage of justice." Engle, supra, at 
135. There is no allegation that the testimony about the 
school bus incident was false or in any way misleading. Nor 
can it be argued that the prospect that Dr. Pile might later 
testify against him had the effect of foreclosing meaningful 
exploration of psychiatric defenses. While that concern is a 
very real one in the abstract, here the record clearly shows 
that Dr. Pile did ask petitioner to discuss the crime he stood 
accused of committmg as well as prior incidents of deviant 
sexual conduct. Although initially reluctant to do so, ulti-
mately petitioner was forthcoming on both subjects. In 
short, the alle ed constitutional error neither recluded the 
development of true facts nor resulted in the admission of 
false ones. Thus, even assuming t at, as a legal matter, Dr . .._____ 
Pile's testimony should not have been presented to the jury, 
its admission did not serve to pervert the jury's deliberations 
or otherwise deflect their attention from the ultimate ques-
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tion whether in fact petitioner constituted a continuing 
threat to society. Under these circumstances, we do not be-
lieve that refusal to consider the defaulted claim on federal 
habeas carries with it the risk of a manifest miscarriage of 
~ustice. . -
rtf ~ Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Ap-
1'(, peals upholding the dismissal of petitioner's application for a 
' writ of habeas corpus. 
Affirmed. 
.Suvrtntt ~ond of tl{t ~b ,jmtts 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
.inprnnt <qanrt Df tlft 'Jnibb .itatte 
-blfin:g~ ~. <!f. 20~'!~ 
April 7, 1986 
Re: No. 85-5487 Smith v. Murray 
Dear Sandra, 
Please join me in your opinion. 
Will you give some consideration to revising the 
sentence presently beginning at the bottom of page 10 and 
running over to page 11 which now reads as follows: 
"Thus, even assuming that, as a legal matter, Dr. 
Pile's testimony should not have been presented to 
the jury, its admission did not serve to pervert 
the jury's deliberation or otherwise deflect their 
attention from the ultimate question whether in 
fact petitioner constituted a continuing threat to 
~ociety." 
I think the phrase "otherwise deflect their attention 
from the ultimate question whether in fact petitioner 
constituted a continuing threat to society," goes a good 
deal further than your "actual innocence" exception to the 
procedural bar enunciated in Murray v. Carrier. I think 
this phrase would allow lower courts to avoid the procedural 
bar of Sykes by simply determining that irrelevant evidence 
had been admitted which, simply because it was irrelevant, 
might serve to "deflect" the attention of the jury from the 
ultimate question of whether petitioner constituted a 
continuing threat to society. This could conceivably 
embrace situations over and above those in which it is 
determined that "a constitutional violation has probably 
resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 
innocent ••• " (quote on page 10 of circulating draft from 
Murray v. Carrier). I think the more different ways you try 
to state the exception, the more it will be subject to 
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.tn.prtm.t <qourt ltf l4t 'Jnittb .jtalt.&' 
Jht~ltington.~. <q. 2llp'l~ 
April 11, 1986 
No. 85-5487 Smith v. Murray 
Dear Bill, 
I am circulating a second draft opinion in 
this case which includes a minor change to the sentence 
you found troublesome. I hope the change adequately 
addresses your concern. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
-
CH,.,M8ERS 01' 
..JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.tlnprtmt C!fo-url qf tlft ~nittlt i$hdt• 
-.uJritqlhtn. ~. Clf. 20~~~ 
April 24, 1986 
Re: 85-5487 - Smith v. Murray 
Dear Sandra: 
v 
Inadvertently I failed to ~dvise you~arlier, 
but I am working on the dissent in this case. 
Respectfully, 
Justice O'Connor 
Copies to the Conference 
., 
,, . 
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From: Justice Stevens 
Circulated: --IM¥~-<A~YL--U-2 _..2_.1......,98.o.6<----
Recirculated: ________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-5487 
" MICHAEL MARNELL SMITH, PETITIONER v. ED-
WARD W. MURRAY, DIRECTOR, VIRGINIA 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE NITED S ATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE F URTH CIR UIT 
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
The record in this case unquestionably demonstrates that 
petitioner's constitutional claim is meritorious, and that there 
is a significant risk that he will be put to death because his 
constitutional rights were violated. 
The Court does not take issue with this conclusion. It is 
willing to assume that (1) petitioner's Fifth Amendment right 
against compelled self-incrimination was violated; (2) his 
Eighth Amendment right to a fair, constitutionally sound 
sentencing proceeding was violated by the introduction of the 
evidence from that Fifth Amendment violation; and (3) those 
constitutional :violations made the difference between life and 
death in the jury's consideration of his fate. Although the 
constitutional violations and issues were sufficiently serious 
that this Court decided to grant certiorari, and although the 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided the issue on 
the merits, this Court concludes that petitioner's presumably 
meritorious constitutional claim is procedurally barred and 
that petitioner must therefore be executed. 
In my opinion, the Court should reach the merits of peti-
tioner's argument. To the extent that there has been a pro-
cedural "default," it is exceedingly minor. Petitioner's coun-
sel raised a timely objection to the introduction of the 
evidence obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment. A 
t+{ M-· 
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respected friend of the Court-the University of Virginia 
Law School's Post-Conviction Assistance Project-brought 
the issue to the attention of the Virginia Supreme Court in an 
extensive amicus curiae brief. Smith's counsel also raised 
the issue in state and federal habeas corpus proceedings, and, 
as noted, the Court of Appeals decided the case on the mer-
its. Consistent with the well-established principle that ap-
pellate arguments should be carefully winnowed,t however, 
Smith's counsel did not raise the Fifth Amendment issue in 
his original appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court-an un-
surprising decision in view of the fact that a governing Vir-
ginia Supreme Court precedent, which was then entirely 
valid and only two years old, decisively barred the claim. 2 
Nevertheless, the Court terms the lawyer's decision not to 
include the constitutional claim "virtually fatal" to Smith's 
position, ante, at 7-an unfortunately apt description in light 
of the Court's disposition. The Court offers the remarkable 
explanation that "[u]nder these circumstances"-in which pe-
titioner's death penalty will stand despite serious Fifth and 
Eighth Amendment violations that played a critical role in 
the determination that death is an appropriate penalty-"we 
do not believe that refusal to consider the defaulted claim in 
federal habeas corpus carries with it the risk of a manifest 
miscarriage of justice." Ante, at 11. 
I fear that the Court has lost its way in a procedural maze 
of its own creation and that it has grossly misevaluated the 
requirements of "law and justice" that are the federal court's 
statutory mission under the federal habeas corpus statute. 3 
To understand the nature of the Court's error, it is necessary 
to assess the Court's conclusion that the claim is procedurally 
defaulted; to consider the Fifth Amendment violation; and to 
consider the Eighth Amendment violation. 
1 See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U. S. 745, 751-752 (1983); ante, at 8. 
' See Gibson v. Commonwealth, 219 S. E. 2d 845 (Va. 1975). 
3 See 28 U. S. C. § 2243 ("The court shall ... dispose of the matter as 
law and justice require"). 
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We begin with the common ground. The historic office of 
the Great Writ as the ultimate protection against funda-
mental unfairness is well-known. 4 That mission is reflected 
in the statutory requirement that the federal court "dispose 
of the matter as law and justice require." 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2243. It is by now equally clear that the application of the 
Court's "cause and prejudice" formulation as a rigid bar tore-
view of fundamental constitutional violations has no support 
in the statute, or in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 
(b)(2), from which it was initially imported; 5 the standard 
thus represents judicial lawmaking of the most unabashed 
form. The Court nonetheless reaffirms today, as it has con-
sistently held in the past, 6 that federal courts retain the 
power to entertain federal habeas corpus requests despite the 
absence of "cause and prejudice," ante, at 10; the only ques-
tion is whether to exercise that power. Despite the rigor of 
its cause and prejudice standard, moreover, the Court contin-
ues to commit itself to maintaining the availability of habeas 
corpus under certain circumstances, even in the absence of 
"cause," ibid ; indeed, this Term, the Court has emphasized 
the importance of that availability by remanding a case to 
consider the merits of a prisoner's claim even though the pris-
oner failed to show "cause" for the default. Murray v. Car-
rier, --U. 8.-- (1986) . 
. 'See, e. g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 126 (1982) ("The writ of ha-
beas corpus indisputably holds an honored position in our jurisprudence . 
. . . Today, as in prior centuries, the writ is a bulwark against convictions 
that violate 'fundamental fairness'"). 
5 See Murray v. Carrier,- u.s.-,- (1986) (STEVENS, J., 
concurring in judgment) (slip op. 5-9). Indeed, the Court in Murray con-
ceded that "[t]he cause and prejudice test may lack a perfect historical ped-
igree," Murray, at- (slip op. 16), and noted that "the Court acknowl-
edged as much in Wainwright v. Sykes." Ibid. 
•see, e. g., Reed v. Ross , 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984); Francis v. Henderson, 
425 U. S. 536, 538 (1976); Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 392, 309-399 (1963). 
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The Court concludes in this case that no miscarriage of jus-
tice will result from a refusal to entertain Smith's challenge 
to his death sentence. This conclusion is flawed in three re-
spects. First, the Court mistakenly assumes that only a 
claim implicating "actual innocence" rises to the level of a 
miscarriage of justice. Second, the Court does not properly 
assess the force of a claim that a death penalty is invalid. Fi-
nally, the Court vastly exaggerates the State interest in re-
fusing to entertain this claim. 
The Court accurately quotes the holding in Murray v. Car-
rier: "'[W]here a constitutional violation has probably re-
sulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a fed-
eral habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a 
showing of cause for the procedural default."' Ante, at 10. 
The Court then seeks to transfer this "actual innocence" 
standard to capital sentencing proceedings, and concludes 
that, in petitioner's sentencing hearing, "the alleged constitu-
tional error neither precluded the development of true facts 
nor resulted in the admission of false ones." Ibid. The 
Court does not explain, however, why Carrier's clearly cor-
rect holding about the propriety of the writ in a case of inno-
cence must also be a limiting principle on the federal court's 
ability to exercise its statutory authority to entertain federal 
habeas corpus actions; more specifically, the Court does not 
explain why the same principle should not apply when a con-
stitutional violation is claimed to have resulted in a lack of 
fundamental fairness, either in a conviction or in a death 
sentence. 
This analysis is far removed from the traditional under-
standing of habeas corpus. For instance, in Moore v. Demp-
sey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923), the Court considered a claim that 
the murder convictions and death sentences of five black de-
fendants were unconstitutional. The federal District Court 
had dismissed the writ of habeas corpus. In his opinion for 
the Court, Justice Holmes explained that in view of the alle-
gations-systematic ex<;lusion of blacks from the jury and 
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threatened mob violence-the federal District Court should 
not have dismissed the writ without considering the factual 
allegations. The Court noted the presence of a clear proce-
dural default-the Arkansas Supreme Court had refused to 
entertain the challenge to discrimination in the jury because 
the objection "came too late." !d., at 91. The Court never-
theless held that the federal District Court should have en-
tertained the petition. I d., at 92. 
Although the allegations clearly implicated questions about 
the accuracy of the truth-finding process, the Court's opinion 
cannot be fairly read to rest on the kind of "innocence" in-
quiry that the Court propounds today. For the Court spe-
cifically rejected the notion that its inquiry into the presence 
of a serious constitutional violation was actually an inquiry 
into the guilt or innocence of the petitioners: "The petitioners 
say that [the victim] must have been killed by other whites 
[rather than by the black petitioners], but that we leave to 
one side as what we have to deal with is not the petitioners' 
innocence or guilt but solely the question whether their con-
stitutional rights have been preserved." 261 U. S., at 87-88 
(emphasis added). Today, the Court adopts the converse of 
Justice Holmes's proposition: it leaves to one side the ques-
tion whether constitutional rights have been preserved, and 
considers only the petitioner's innocence or guilt. 7 
The majority's reformulation of the traditional understand-
ing of habeas corpus appears to be premised on the notion 
7 In doing so, the Court goes a long way toward eliminating the distinc-
tion, in procedural default cases, between the request for habeas relief and 
the ultimate issue for a trial court-a distinction that has long been central 
to our understanding of the Great Writ. See, e. g., Ex Parte Bollman, 4 
Cranch 75, 101 (1807) (Marshall, C. J.) ("It has been demonstrated at the 
bar, that the question brought forward on a habeas corpus, is always dis-
tinct from that which is involved in the cause itself. The question whether 
the individual shall be imprisoned is always distinct from the question 
whether he shall be convicted or acquitted of the charge on which he is to 
be tried, and therefore these questions are separated, and may be decided 
in different courts"). 
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that only constitutional violations which go to guilt or inno-
cence are sufficiently serious to implicate the "fundamental 
fairness" alluded in Engle v. Isaac. 8 If accuracy in the 
determination of guilt or innocence were the only value of our 
criminal justice system, then the Court's analysis might have 
a great deal of force. If accuracy is the only value, however, 
then many of our constitutional protections-such as the 
Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination 
and the Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual 
punishment, the very claims asserted by petitioner-are not 
only irrelevant, but possibly counter-productive. 9 Our Con-
stitution, however, and our decision to adopt an "accusa-
torial," rather than an "inquisitorial" system of justice, 10 re-
flects a different choice. That choice is to afford the 
individual certain protections-the right against compelled 
self-incrimination and the right against cruel and unusual 
punishment among them-even if those rights do not neces-
sarily implicate the accuracy of the truth-finding proceed-
ings. Rather, those protections are an aspect of the funda-
mental fairness, liberty, and individual dignity that our 
society affords to all, even those charged with heinous 
crimes. 
8 See n. 4, supra. 
9 Expressing this view, William Howard Taft once observed that, pre-
cisely because of the central value of accuracy in guilt or innocence deter-
minations, the Fifth Amendment might have been ill-advised. See Taft, 
The Administration of Criminal Law, 15 Yale L. J. 1, 8 (1905) ("When ex-
amined as an original proposition, the prohibition that the defendant in a 
criminal case shall not be compelled to testify seems, in some aspects, to be 
of doubtful utility. If the administration of criminal law is for the purpose 
of convicting those who are guilty of crime, then it seems natural to follow 
in such a process the methods that obtain in ordinary life"). 
10 See Moran v. Burbine, -- U. S. --,-- (1986) (STEVENS, J., dis-
senting) (slip op. 1-2 and n. 1); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U. S. --,--(slip 
op. 5) (1985); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 7-8 (1964); Rogers v. Rich-
mond, 365 U. S. 534, 540-541 (1961); Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 
532, 543-545 (1897). 
' ~; .. , 
I· 
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In my opinion, then, the Court's exaltation of accuracy as 
the only characteristic of "fundamental fairness" is deeply 
flawed. Our criminal justice system, and our Constitution, 
protects other values in addition to the reliability of the guilt 
or innocence determination, and the statutory duty to serve 
"law and justice" should similarly reflect those values. 
Thus, the Court begins with a conception of "fundamental 
fairness" that is far too narrow and that conflicts with the na-
ture of our criminal justice system. The Court similarly fails 
to give appropriate weight to the fact that capital punishment 
is at stake in this case. It is now well settled that "death is a 
different kind of punishment from any other which may be 
imposed in this country." Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 
349, 357 (1977) (STEVENS, J .). 11 It is of vital importance to 
1 
11 See also California v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992, 998-999 (1983) ("The 
Court, as well as the separate opinions of a majority of the individual Jus-
tices, has recognized that the qualitative difference of death from all other 
punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the 
capital sentencing determination"); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862, 884 
(1983) ("(T]here is a qualitative difference between death and any other 
permissible form of punishment"); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 272 
(1980) ("This theme, the unique nature of the death penalty for purposes of 
Eighth Amendment analysis, has been repeated time and again in our opin-
ions. . . . (A] sentence of death differs in kind from any sentence of impris-
onment"); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 605 (1978) (BURGER, C. J.) 
("[T]he imposition of death by public authority is ... profoundly different 
from all other procedures"). Cf. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Fed-
eral Rights, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1130, 1222 (1986) ("[W]hen a capital defend-
ant raises a nonfrivolous constitutional question, neither state nor federal 
courts should be free to refuse to decide it simply because it was not raised 
in accordance with state procedural requirements. Rather, federal law 
should expressly provide that in matters of procedural defaults, as in other 
matters, death is different"). 
Indeed, the Court has recognized that even the threat of a death penalty 
may, in certain circumstances, exert a special pull in favor of the exercise 
of the federal court's undisputed statutory power to entertain a habeas cor-
pus writ on a claim that was procedurally defaulted. In Fay v. Noia, 372 
U. S. 391, 440 (1963), the Court was willing to excuse Noia's deliberate de-
cision not to appeal because N oia perceived that a death sentence might 
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the defendant and to the community that any decision to im-
pose the death sentence be, and appear to be, the conse-
quence of scrupulously fair procedures. When a condemned 
prisoner raises a substantial, colorable Eighth Amendment 
violation, there is a special obligation, consistent with the 
statutory mission to "dispose of the matter as law and justice 
require," to consider whether the prisoner's claim would ren-
der his sentencing proceeding fundamentally unfair. In-
deed, it was precisely this concern that prompted the Court 
of Appeals to consider petitioner's argument on the merits: 
"[W]e give weight to the consideration that we have before 
us a matter of life and death. The imminent execution of 
Smith serves as sufficient grounds to review the issue." 769 
F. 2d 170, 172. 
Finally, as in every habeas corpus decision, the magnitude 
of the State's interest must be considered. In this case, sev-
eral factors suggest that the State's interest is not adequate 
to obstruct federal habeas corpus consideration of petitioner's 
claim. First, petitioner made a timely objection at trial, and 
the State interest in enforcing procedural default rules at 
trial is far greater than the State's interest in enforcing pro-
cedural default rules on appeal. 12 Second, the issue was 
raised before the State in an amicus curiae brief. 13 Since this 
is a matter on which courts ordinarily may exercise discre-
result: "His was the grisly choice whether to sit content with life imprison-
ment or to travel the uncertain avenue of appeal which, if successful, might 
well have led to a retrial and death sentence." See also Wainwright v. 
Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 83 (1977) (emphasizing Noia's "'grisly choice' between 
acceptance of his life sentence and pursuit of an appeal which might culmi-
nate in a sentence of death"). 
12 See Murray v. Carrier, --U.S. --, -- (1986) (STEVENS, J., 
concurring in judgment); Meltzer, 99 Harv. L. Rev., at 1223-1225; Note, 
Procedural Defaults at the Appellate Stage and Federal Habeas Corpus 
Review, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 463 (1986). 
13 See Brief for University of Virginia Law School Post-Conviction 
Assistance Project as Amicus Curiae, 56-61 (arguing that the Fifth 
Amendment required suppression of psychiatrist's testimony). 
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tion, 14 the discretionary decision not to address the issue 
hardly rises to a State interest of sufficient magnitude that a 
man should die even though his Fifth and Eighth Amend-
ment rights were violated to achieve that objective. Third, 
the issue was presented to the State courts in state habeas 
proceedings-after the precedent blocking petitioner's claim 
had been repudiated15-and the State habeas court, while 
finding that the decision by Smith's counsel not to raise the 
issue with a governing Virginia precedent squarely against 
him was entirely reasonable, 16 concluded that the Fifth 
Amendment claim was procedurally barred and thus did not 
address it. 17 Fourth, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit addressed the merits and did not rest on any notion of 
procedural default; this Court customarily defers to federal 
Courts of Appeals on questions of State law, 18 including ques-
14 Cf. Schwinden v. Burlington Northern, 691 P. 2d 1351, (Mont. 1984) 
("We determine here not to follow the usual rule that issues raised by amici 
that are part of the underlying action will not be considered by this 
Court"). 
16 See Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581 F. 2d 75 (CA4 1978) (holding that the 
Gibson v. Commonwealth analysis violates Constitution and that writ of 
habeas corpus should issue). In fact, although the Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit decided Gibson after the briefs in petioner's case had 
been filed, the Gibson opinion was issued before the initial Virginia 
Supreme Court opinion refusing to address the issue. 
16 See State Habeas opinion, App. 147 ("[B]oth Gibson v. Zahradnick and 
Smith v. Estelle were decided after petitioner's trial. Thus, regardless of 
their usefulness in theory to sustain an appeal, neither was in fact available 
to counsel when needed .... In light of these facts and of the differences 
noted above, I find sufficient reason for counsel not to have raised on ap-
peal the arguments presented here. I thus conclude that counsel exer-
cised reasonable judgment in deciding not to preserve the objection on 
appeal"). 
17 State Habeas order, Record 204 (Fifth Amendment issue "was waived 
and forfeited and cannot now be considered"). 
'
8 See, e. g., Pembaur v. Cincinnatti, --U.S.--,-- (1986) (slip 
op. 14 n. 13); Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing,-- U.S. 
--, --, n. 10 (1985) (slip op. 10, n. 10); United States v. S. A. Empresa 
de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 467 U. S. 797, 815, n. 12 (1984); Bishop v. 
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tions about "cause" for failure to comply with State proce-
dural rules. 19 Finally, and most importantly, the inadequacy 
of the State interest in this death penalty context is deci-
sively shown by the prevailing practice in many States that 
appellate courts have a special duty in capital cases to over-
look procedural defaults and review the trial record for re-
versible error, before affirming that most severe of all 
sentences. 20 
Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 345-347 (1976); Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472, 
486-487 (1949). 
19 See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U. S. 231, 234 n. 1 (1980) ("The applica-
bility of the Sykes 'cause'-and-'prejudice' test may turn on an interpreta-
tion of state law .... This Court's resolution of such a state-law question 
would be aided significantly by views of other federal courts that may pos-
sess greater familiarity with [state] law"); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 
263, 267 n. 7 (1980) ("Deferring to the Court of Appeals' interpretation of 
Texas law, we decline to hold that Wainwright bars Rummel from present-
ing his claim"). 
20 See, e. g., Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure 39(k) ("In all cases in 
which the death penalty has been imposed, ... the Supreme Court may 
notice any plain error or defect in the proceeding under review, whether or 
not brought to the attention of the trial court and take appropriate action 
by reason thereof, whenever such error has, or probably has, adversely af-
fected the substantial rights of the petitioner"); Arkansas Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 43-2725 ("where either a sentence for life imprisonment or death [is 
present], the Supreme Court shall review all errors prejudicial to the 
rights of the appellant"); Cave v. Florida, 476 So. 2d 180, 183 n.1 (1985) (In 
capital cases, "[w]e will, of course, continue to review every issue pre-
sented and to conduct our own review in accordance with Florida Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 9.140(f)"); Georgia Unified Appeal Rule B(2) (In capi-
tal cases, "[t]he Supreme Court shall review each of the assertions of error 
timely raised by the defendant during the proceedings in the trial court re-
gardless of whether or not an assertion of error was presented to the trial 
court by motion for new trial, and regardless of whether error is enumer-
ated in the Supreme Court"); State v. Osborn, 631 P. 2d 187, 192-193 (Ida. 
1981) ("Death is clearly a different kind of punishment from any other that 
might be imposed, and [Idaho Code] § 19-2827 mandates that we examine 
not only the sentence but the procedure followed in imposing that sentence 
regardless of whether an appeal is even taken. This indicates that we may 
not ignore unchallenged errors. Moreover, the gravity of a sentence of 
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Thus, the Court is mistaken in its narrow definition of fun-
damental fairness, in its failure to appreciate the significance 
of a challenge to a death penalty, and in its exaggeration of 
the State's interest in refusing to entertain a claim that was 
death and the infrequency with which it is imposed outweigh any rationale 
that might be proposed to justify refusal to consider errors not objected to 
below"); People v. Holman, --Ill. --, --, 469 N. E. 2d 119, 140 
(1984) ("Ordinarily, a contention not made in the trial court is waived on 
appeal. ... However, because of the qualitative difference between death 
and other forms of punishment ... this court has elected to address errors 
in death penalty cases which might have affected the decision of the sen-
tencing jury"); Lowery v. State, 478 N. E. 2d 1214, 1229 (Ind. 1985) ("The 
failure to properly raise issues in the Motion to Correct Errors generally 
results in a waiver of the claimed errors .... Since the death penalty was 
imposed in this case, however, we will review the state of the record con-
cerning these questions"); Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S. W. 2d 671, 675 
(Ky. 1984) ("[l]n a death penalty case every prejudicial error must be con-
sidered, whether or not an objection was made in the trial court"); State v. 
Hamilton, 478 So. 2d 123, 127 n. 7 (La. 1985) ("In death penalty cases, this 
court has reviewed assignments of error, despite the absence of a contem-
poraneous objection, in order to determine whether the error 'render[ed] 
the result unreliable,' thus avoiding later consideration of the error in the 
context of ineffective assistance of counsel"); State v. Nave, 694 S. W. 2d 
729, 738 (Mo. 1985) ("Several states hold that the general rule that allega-
tions of court error not assigned in a motion for new trial are not preserved 
for appellate review, codified in Missouri Rule 29.11(d) with exceptions not 
applicable here, is inapplicable in death penalty cases. Even though the 
assignment of error has been improperly preserved, we review, ex gratia, 
the point relied on for plain error . .. to determine if manifest injustice or a 
miscarriage of justice resulted from the denial of Nave's request for con-
tinuance"); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 383 A. 2d 174, 
180-181 (1978) ("Because imposition of the death penalty is irrevocable in 
its finality, it is imperative that the standards by which that sentence is 
fixed be constitutionally beyond reproach .... The waiver rule cannot be 
exalted to a position so lofty as to require this Court to blind itself to the 
real issue-the propriety of allowing the state to conduct an illegal execu-
tion"); State v. Patterson, 295 S. E. 2d 264, 264-165 (S.C. 1982) ("On ap-
peal from a murder conviction in which the death penalty is imposed, this 
Court will review the entire record for prejudicial error in favorem vitae, 
regardless of whether the error was properly preserved for review"); State 
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raised at trial, on appeal by an amicus, and in state habeas 
proceedings; that was addressed on the merits by the Court 
of Appeals (and briefed and argued on the merits in this 
Court); and that must be assumed to make the difference be-
tween life and death. Because I disagree with the Court's 
evaluation of these matters, I would address the merits of pe-
titioner's argument that constitutional violations render his 
sentence of death fundamentally unfair. 
II 
The introduction of petitioner's comments to the court-ap-
pointed psychiatrist clearly violated the Fifth Amendment. 
As the majority points out, psychiatric reports by court-ap-
pointed psychiatrists "were routinely forwarded to the court 
... and were then admissible under Virginia law." Ante, at 
2. However, "[a]t no point prior to or during the interview 
did Dr. Pile inform petitioner that his statements might later 
be used against him or that he had the right to remain silent 
and to have counsel present if he so desired." Ante, at 2. 
Moreover, the court-appointed psychiatrist related petition-
er's description of an earlier sexual assault in a letter to the 
court and to the prosecution, as well as to the defense, and 
testified about the description, at the State's request, at peti-
tioner's capital sentencing hearing. The State thus relied on 
Dr. Pile's testimony as evidence of "future dangerousness," 
one of the two aggravating circumstances found by the jury 
to justify a sentence of death. 21 
omission. Nevertheless, as this is a capital case, we consider the defend-
ant's contention on appeal"). 
Indeed, Virginia law itself recognizes the special obligations attendant 
on reviewing death penalties by providing for automatic Virginia Supreme 
Court review of the death penalty, § 17-110.1A, and giving capital cases 
priority on the Court's docket, § 17-110.2. Some State Supreme Courts 
interpret such statutes to impose an obligation on the Court to review the 
transcript for all possible errors. See, e. g., State v. Osborn, supra. 
21 See Prosecutor's Closing Argument at Sentencing Phase, App. 30-31 
("Now, as I said, you all, the Court has instructed you that you all may fix 
his punishment at death, if the Commonwealth proved its case-proved the 
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CHIEF JusTICE BURGER's opinion for the Court in Estelle 
v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454 (1981), makes it absolutely clear that 
the introduction of this evidence by the prosecution at the 
sentencing stage violated the Fifth Amendment. As THE 
CHIEF JUSTICE explained, the Fifth Amendment fully applies 
to a capital sentencing proceeding: "Just as the Fifth Amend-
ment prevents a criminal defendant from being made "'the 
deluded instrument of his own conviction,"" Culombe v. 
Connecticut, 367 U. S. [568,] 581, quoting 2 Hawkins, Pleas 
of the Crown 595 (8th ed. 1824), it protects him as well from 
being made 'the deluded instrument' of his own execution." 
451 U. S., at 454. As THE CHIEF JUSTICE also explained, 
prosecutorial use of evidence from a psychiatric interrogation 
in a capital sentencing proceeding requires the protections, 
and warnings, accorded the Fifth Amendment right in other 
contexts: "Because [the defendant] did not voluntarily con-
sent to the pretrial psychiatric examination after being in-
formed of his right to remain silent and the possible use of his 
statements, the State could not rely on what he said to [the 
psychiatrist] to establish his future dangerousness." 451 
U. S., at 468. 
Thus, the use of petitioner's statements clearly violated the 
Fifth Amendment. 22 In view of the majority's willingness to 
assume that the constitutional violation is present but that 
the failure to address it does not affect the fundamental fair-
ness of petitioner's sentence, moreover, it is instructive tore-
call the importance of the Fifth Amendment right at issue. 
prior history that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would con-
stitute a continuous serious threat to society, Now, what has the Common-
wealth proved? The Commonwealth has proved that prior to the crime 
you all convicted him of yesterday, that he assaulted a person on the bus. 
He said he did it .... Tore her clothes off, and then decided not to do it"). 
22 The state trial court's rejection of petitioner's trial objection to the psy-
chiatrist's testimony stands in sharp contrast to THE CHIEF JUSTICE's Es-
telle analysis: "I don't believe that Doctor Pile has any duty to inform him 
that anything he may say to him may be used for or against him in a Court 
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Again, THE CHIEF JUSTICE's opinion in Estelle v. Smith pro-
vides guidance: 
"Miranda held that 'the prosecution may not use 
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory stem-
ming from custodial interrogation of the defendant un-
less it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards ef-
fective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.' 
... The purpose of these admonitions is to combat what 
the Court saw as 'inherently compelling pressures' at 
work on the person and to provide him with an aware-
ness of the Fifth Amendment privilege and the conse-
quences of foregoing it, which is the prerequisite for 'an 
intelligent decision as to its exercise.' ... 
"The Fifth Amendment privilege is 'as broad as the 
mischief against which it seeks to guard,' Counselman v. 
Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 542, 562 (1892), and the privilege is 
fulfilled only when a criminal defendant is guaranteed 
the right 'to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in 
the unfettered exercise of his own will and to suffer no 
penalty . . . for such silence.' Malloy v. Hogan, 378 
U. S. at 81 (1964)." 
Given the historic importance of the Fifth Amendment, 
and the fact that the violation of this right made a significant 
difference in the jury's evaluation of petitioner's "future dan-
gerousness" (and consequent death sentence), it is not only 
proper, but imperative, that the federal courts entertain peti-
tioner's entirely meritorious argument that the introduction 
of the psychiatrist's testimony at his sentencing hearing vio-
lated that fundamental protection. 23 
23 The State argues that petitioner's case is distinguishable from Estelle 
because the defense requested the psychiatric examination. In view of 
the fact that Dr. Pile related the account to the prosecution and the court, 
and testified for the prosecution, he was quite clearly an "agent of the 
State" in the same sense in which the psychiatrist in Estelle was an agent 
of the State. See 451 U. S. , at 467 ("When Dr. Grigson went beyond sim-
ply reporting to the court on .the issue of competence and testified for the 
' 
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It is also quite clear that the introduction of the evidence 
violated his Eighth Amendment right to a fair sentencing 
proceeding. In this respect, I disagree with the Court of 
Appeals' reading of the opinion that I authored for the Court 
in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862 (1983). The Court of Ap-
peals concluded that, because the jury also found an ag-
gravating circumstance of "vileness," the death sentence 
could stand even if Dr. Pile's testimony represented a fla-
grant Fifth Amendment violation. 
In Zant, we held that the Georgia Supreme Court's invali-
dation of one of the three aggravating circumstances found 
by the jury did not require that the death penalty be set 
aside. But that conclusion was reached only after we satis-
fied ourselves that the evidence relating to the invalid ag-
gravating circumstance had been properly admitted. 24 We 
prosecution at the penalty phase on the crucial issue of respondent's future 
dangerousness, his role changed and became essentially like that of an 
agent of the State recounting unwarned statements made in a postarrest 
custodial setting"). 
Petitioner and amici, in tum, argue that, because the examination was to 
assist the defense, an absolute guarantee of confidentiality, rather than 
Miranda warnings, should have been required. They contend that such 
confidentiality is especially important to effectuate the Due Process right 
to consult with a psychiatrist that was recognized in Ake v. Oklahoma, 
-- U. S. -- (1985). Since, at a minimum, Estelle required that Dr. 
Pile give Miranda warnings, we need not consider the possiblity that dis-
closure would have been inappropriate in any circumstances. For it is at 
least clear that, under these circumstances, his testimony violated petition-
er's Fifth Amendment right. 
24 "But the invalid aggravating circumstances found by the jury in this 
case was struck down in Arnold because the Georgia Supreme Court con-
cluded that it fails to provide an adequate basis for distinguishing a murder 
case in which the death penalty may be imposed from those cases in which 
such a penalty may not be imposed. See nn. 5 and 16, supra. The under-
lying evidence is nevetheless fully admissible at the sentencing phase. . . . " 
"Thus, any evidence on which the jury might have relied in this case to 
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did not conclude, as the Court of Appeals seems to have as-
sumed, that any evidence concerning the invalid circum-
stance was simply irrelevant because the valid circumstances 
were, in all events, sufficient to support the death penalty. 
The fact that the record adequately establishes one valid ag-
gravating circumstance may make the defendant eligible for 
the death penalty but it does not justify the conclusion that a 
death sentence should stand even though highly prejudicial 
inadmissible evidence was presented to the jury at the sen-
tencing hearing. The introduction of such highly prejudicial, 
inadmissible evidence-evidence that itself represents an in-
dependent constitutional violation-quite clearly undermines 
the validity of the capital sentencing proceeding and violates 
the Eighth Amendment. 
IV 
Thus, I would not only reach the merits of petitioner's con-
stitutional claim but also would conclude that it has merit. 
The question that remains is the one the Court addresses in 
the last two paragraphs of its opinion-whether the constitu-
tional error warrants the conclusion that the death penalty 
should be set aside in this habeas corpus proceeding. I think 
of serious assaultive offenses, as he concedes he has been, was properly 
adduced at the sentencing hearing and was fully subject to explanation by 
the defendant." Id., at 886 (emphasis added). 
We continued: 
"Our decision in this case depends in part on the existence of an impor-
tant procedural safeguard, the mandatory appellate review of each death 
sentence by the Georgia Supreme Court to avoid arbitrariness and to as-
sure proportionality. We accept that court's view that the subsequent 
invalidation of one of several statutory aggravating circumstances does not 
automatically require reversal of the death penalty, having been assured 
that a death sentence will be set aside if the invalidation of an aggravating 
circumstance makes the penality arbitrary and capricious. 250 Ga., at 
101, 297 S. E. 2d, at 4. The Georgia Supreme Court, in its response to our 
certified question, expressly stated: 'A different result might be reached in 
a case where evidence was submitted in support of a statutory aggravating 
circumstance which was not otherwise admissible and thereafter the cir-
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that question should be answered by reference to the lan-
guage of the governing statute-the writ should issue "as law 
and justice require." To hold, as the Court does today, that 
petitioner's death sentence must stand despite the fact that 
blatant constitutional violations presumably made the differ-
ence between the jury's recommendation of life or death, vio-
lates not only "law," but, quite clearly, "justice" as well. 
I respectfully dissent. 
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